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However, there is a distinct difference between physical deficiencies
and intoxication. Poor eyesight and hearing cannot always be remedied
but intoxication is usually a voluntary condition wherein the person
intoxicated risks losing the full use of his senses. So there is not as
much reason why the courts should include intoxication in the exceptions
to the objective standard test. But if the intoxicated man does meet the
requirements of this test and his conduct or acts are equal to what the
reasonably prudent sober man would do in the circumstances, that is all
that is required. WILLIAM M. DRENNEN.
WANTON MISCONDUCT DISTINGUISHED FROM NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff collided with the rear of a truck owned by defendant. The
evidence showed that the truck was parked a few feet from the side of
the road and that the night was misty and rainy. Whether or not the
tail light of the truck was burning was a disputed fact, but the accident
occurred near a street light. It was admitted by the plaintiff that he
was driving at a speed such that he could not bring his car to a stop
within the assured clear distance ahead. In his amended petition plain-
tiff characterized the act of the defendant as "wanton, wilful, gross
negligence and misconduct." The trial judge charged the jury on the
issue of wanton negligence stating that if such be found defendant could
not avail himself of his plea of contributory negligence.
Held: Facts must be pleaded which reveal on their face the element
of wantonness and it was an error on the part of the trial judge to
instruct the jury on the question of wantonness in this case. Universal
Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 2o Abs. No. 18, vii,
5 Ohio Op. 214 (1936).
The distinction between a wilful act and a negligent act is rather
well defined. A wilful act is one in which the party acting intends to
bring about a certain result. A negligent act is one in which the party
acting fails to come up to a required standard of care. Payne v. Vance,
103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N.E. 85 (1921); Stauffer v. Schlegel, 74 Ind.
App. 431, 129 N.E. 44 (1930).
The law often treats a wilful act more severely than a negligent one.
Contributory negligence is no defense when the defendant has been
guilty of a wilful act. Payne v. Vance, supra. Punitive damages may
be secured against a wilful tortfeasor but not against a negligent one.
Simpson et al. v. McCa/frey, 13 Ohio 509 (1844) ; in Ohio a driver of
a car is liable to a gratuitous guest for a wilful injurious act but not for
his negligence. Ohio G.C. Sec. 6308-6.
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It seems evident that wantonness lies somewhere between wilfulness
and negligence. Higbee Co. v. Jackson, ioi Ohio St. 75, 128 N.E.
61, 14 A.L.R. 131 (192o). The legal effect of wantonness, however,
is the same as wilfulness. Contributory negligence is no defense against
a wanton act. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Speer, 156 I. 244, 4o N.E. 835
(1895). Punitive damages can be assessed for a wanton act which re-
sults in injury. Mobile Electric Co. v. Fritz, 2oo Ala. 692, 77 So. 235
(1912). In Ohio a driver of a car is liable to a guest for a wanton
act which results in injury. Ohio G.C. Sec. 63o8-6. A landowner
is liable to trespassers for either wanton or wilful acts and not for
negligence. Wabash R. Co. v. Norway, 7 O.C.C. 449, 4 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 674 (1893).
A fortiori, the legal effect of wantonness is often very different from
that of negligence. The plaintiff's whole case may depend upon show-
ing that the defendant's conduct was something more than negligent-
that his conduct amounted to wantonness. The line between negligence
and wanton misconduct is not easy to draw. Is a very negligent defend-
ant wanton? The better considered cases say that there is a difference
in kind between the two and not merely a difference in degree. Payne
v. Vance, supra; Reserve Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519,
191 N.E. 745 (934)
The principal case draws a sharp distinction between negligence and
wantonness. Judge Stephenson says, "Mere negligence is not converted
into wanton misconduct by the use of the word "wanton" in connection
with the specifications of negligence-negligence is the failure to exer-
cise ordinary care-wanton misconduct is such conduct as manifests
a disposition to perversity, and it must be under such surrounding and
existing conditions that the party doing the act or failing to act must be
conscious, from his knowledge of such surrounding circumstances and
existing conditions, that his conduct will, in all probability, result in
injury."
The principal case avoids the use of the term "wanton negligence."
Paragraph three of the syllabus states: "Regardless of the fact that the
term 'wanton negligence' is sometimes used both in text and opinion,
such use is unwarranted, as it is a misnomer pure and simple. Wanton
misconduct is positive in nature while negligence is naturally negative."
This seems to be a valid and useful distinction. Wantonness and negli-
gence are dearly inconsistent. One who acts with a positive knowledge
of another's dangerous situation is in a different category from one who
fails to come up to a certain standard of care.
The principal case seems to hold that knowledge of plaintiff's danger
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is a requirement for wanton misconduct. Thus in Vecchio v. Vecchio,
131 Ohio St. 59, 5 Ohio Op. 368 (1936), a recent case arising under
the guest act, a demurrer to the declaration was sustained because plain-
tiff did not allege unequivocally that defendant knew of plaintiff's
danger. The complaint stated, "Defendant was careless and wantonly
negligent, when in the exercise of ordinary care, she knew or ought to
have known that door of said automobile was not closed securely."
(Italics writer's). There are some decisions, however, that permit
recovery where the element is lacking. The following fact situations
are illustrations of cases in which the defendant's conduct was held to
be wanton:
Reserue Trucking Co. v. Fa.rchild, supra; (Truck standing cross-
wise in city street on rainy night.) Higbee Co. v. Jackson, supra;
(Driver of truck passing car at high speed and colliding with wagon
coming from the other direction while plaintiff, a boy, was hanging on
side of truck.) Bernier v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 296 IIl 464, 129
N.E. 747 (192); (Train exceeding speed limit while plaintiff, a
woman, was standing in area between rails of approaching train and
passing freight). Collins v. Missouri-Illinois Ry. Co., 233 Ill. App. 545
(x924); (Engineer backing train without being able to see track on
which he was traveling and running into plaintiff.) Mobile Electric
Co. v. Fritz, supra; (Plaintiff intestate killed by coming in contact with
charged wire belonging to defendant's company, which wire had been
blown down by storm).
On the other hand in the following cases it was held that a charge
of wanton misconduct was incorrect. Johnson v. Duluth, W. & P.
Ry. Co., 152 Minn. i51, 188 N.W. 221 (1922); (Plaintiff, a boy,
falling from footboard of locomotive as a result of the accidental release
of a jet of steam). 1labama Power Co. v. Conine, 21o Ala. 320, 97
So. 791 (1923); (Plaintiff electrocuted by dangling wire. Defend-
ant's superintendent believed wire to be harmless and told plaintiff so.)
Slicker v. Seccombe, 42 Ohio App. 357, 182 N.E. 131, 12o Abs. 507
(1931); (Defendant attempting to pass on right side of automobile on
which plaintiff's wife was riding on running board.)
There is little unanimity among various courts as to what factual
material must be present to justify a charge as to the law on wantonness.
It is evident that a plaintiff who was himself negligent or who was,
under the guest act, a guest in an automobile, would like a jury to find
that the defendant's conduct amounted to wantonness. If the distinc-
tion between the two is to have any substance, it is important that the
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trial court refuse to submit the issue of wantonness to the jury unless
the facts alleged justify such a finding.
The decision in the principle case seems clearly sound, and it is hoped
that it will have a salutary effect in the future.
GEORGE BALEY.
PRACTICE
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION AND AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
One of the most important of the recent decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court of Ohio was the decision of the case of Dowd-Feder,
Inc. v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 5 Ohio Op. 179 (Decided March
i8, i936).
The action was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained
by the plaintiff, when he was struck by an automobile driven in a negli-
gent manner by an employee of the defendant. The defense was being
conducted by an attorney known by counsel for the plaintiff to be an
"insurance company's lawyer." At the trial counsel for the plaintiff on
the voir dire examination of prospective jurors was permitted to question
them as to their relationship to or interest in a casualty insurance com-
pany. The defense moved for withdrawal of a juror because of those
questions, and such motion having been denied, exceptions were duly
taken. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff and judgment was
rendered thereon. The defendant prosecuted error to the Court of
Appeals where the judgment was affirmed. The case was presented to
the Supreme Court on the allowance of a motion to certify.
The Supreme Court held: "In the examination of a prospective
juror upon his voir dire in cases involving property damage, personal
injury, or both, he may be asked the general question whether he has
or has had any connection with or interest in a casualty insurance
company. * * * "
"All questions in the voir dire examination must be propounded in
good faith. The character and scope of such questions cannot become
standardized, but must be controlled by the court in the exercise of its
sound discretion, the court having for its purpose the securing to every
litigant an unbiased jury."
The decision of the Supreme Court in the principal case apparently
settles that much debated question as to the extent to which counsel may
